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We investigate the presence of a shared life cycle component in earnings and test whether the 
earnings of one firm are relevant for valuing other firms in the same life cycle stage. We find that 
firm-pairs in the same life cycle stage have greater accounting comparability and greater co-
movement in their returns, operating performance, and investments than firm-pairs consisting of 
firms in different life cycle stages. We further document economically significant transfers of 
information from announcing firms to non-announcing life cycle peers around an announcing 
firm’s earnings announcement. The magnitudes are comparable to that of intra-industry 
information transfers and do not depend on whether the life cycle peers are also active in the same 
industry. In contrast, we find that intra-industry information transfers are smaller for industry peers 
in different life cycle stages. Information transfers are stronger for life cycle peers that have greater 
(transient) institutional cross-holdings, suggesting that institutional trading is an important 
mechanism by which life cycle information spills over. Overall, this study provides insight into 
the factors that shape a firm’s earnings generation process and investors’ use of such factors. 
Furthermore, this study complements prior literature on firm life cycle by providing additional 






“Skilled analysts must view companies from a perspective that identifies where they stand in their life 
cycle, realizing that companies refusing to ‘act their age’ can destroy value.” (Aswath Damodaran) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we investigate the extent to which there is a common life cycle component in earnings 
and evaluate whether (earnings) information of one firm is relevant for valuing other firms in the 
same life cycle stage. Although documenting the existence of a common component in earnings is 
not new, prior studies have almost uniquely focused on industry as an important driver of a firm’s 
earnings-generating process. As a result, industry-models are now widely used in, for example, 
forecasting, valuation, and the identification of a firm’s fundamentals.  
A large literature documents the existence of information transfers at the industry level. For 
example, Foster (1981) finds that earnings releases of one firm provide information that is relevant 
for valuing other non-announcing firms in the same industry. Specifically, non-announcing peer 
firms’ returns respond to (earnings) information disclosed in the quarterly earnings announcement 
of an announcing firm in the same industry. Other studies have since provided additional evidence 
on the existence and determinants of earnings announcement intra-industry information transfers 
(Han and Wild 1990, 2000; Asthana and Mishra 2001) and have provided evidence of similar 
information transfers around other types of (accounting) disclosures, including management 
earnings forecasts (Baginski 1987; Han, Wild, and Ramesh 1989; Hilary and Shen 2013) and 
analyst reports and recommendations (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Crawford, Roulstone, and 
So 2012). The importance of industry information has been documented in various other settings 
as well. For example, Hui et al. (2016) provide evidence of differential persistence in the firm-
specific and industry-wide components of earnings, cash flows, and accruals, while there is also 
evidence on the importance of analyst industry expertise (e.g., Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach 
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2012), or the importance of managers’ industry expertise in an M&A setting (Custódio and 
Metzger 2013).   
Building on studies in the organization literature that show that firm decisions and decision-
making processes vary predictably across organizational life cycle stages, recent accounting 
studies document the importance of life cycle information for forecasting and valuation 
(Dickinson, 2011; Cantrell and Dickinson 2018; Vorst and Yohn 2018). In addition, studies show 
that the value-relevance of accounting measures and the behavior of accruals vary as a function of 
organizational life cycle (Anthony and Ramesh 1992; Dickinson, Kassa, and Schaberl 2018; 
Hribar and Yehuda, 2015). Other studies use firm life cycle to explain various other (financial) 
decisions such as dividend policies (DeAngelo et al. 2006; Grullon et al. 2002), corporate 
acquisitions (Owen and Yawson 2010), and diversification (Arikan and Stulz 2016), or have 
documented the importance of life cycle (peers) in a compensation setting (Drake and Martin 2015; 
2018). Overall, these studies illustrate the importance of firm life cycle as an inherent determinant 
of firm behavior, firm performance, and the relevance of information attributes in an investor’s 
information set. As such, these studies show evidence of predictable and systematic differences 
across firms in different life cycle stages, such that firms within a life cycle stage exhibit similar 
behavior while firms across life cycle stages exhibit different behavior.  
Triggered by the importance of firm life cycle as a driver of a firm’s behavior and its 
fundamentals, we investigate commonalities across life cycle peers and test for information 
spillovers between announcing firms and their non-announcing life cycle peers. Specifically, we 
expect that the information disclosed in and produced around announcing firms’ earnings 
announcements is useful for valuing other non-announcing firms in the same life cycle stage.  
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We document significant commonalities within pairs of firms in the same life cycle stage 
across a wide range of dimensions relevant in the valuation process. Specifically, we find evidence 
of greater accounting comparability and co-movement in returns, operating performance, and 
investments within pairs of life cycle peers. These results hold irrespective of whether we restrict 
the sample to firm-pairs in the same industry, suggesting that the greater similarities for life cycle 
peers are distinct from and incremental to within-industry commonalities. In line with the greater 
commonalities within pairs of life cycle peers, we also document economically significant 
transfers of information between announcing firms and non-announcing life cycle peers. 
Specifically, we find a significantly positive relation between the three-day earnings 
announcement return of an announcing firm and the return over the same three days of non-
announcing life cycle peers.  
While these results suggest that there is relevant life cycle-wide information in the 
announcing firm’s earnings announcement that spills over to non-announcing life cycle peers, they 
do not speak to which type of information is transferred. We therefore specifically investigate 
whether there is a transfer of earnings information. We group announcing firms into deciles based 
on the magnitude of the analyst forecast-based earnings surprise and calculate the average three-
day abnormal announcement return for the decile, which we then compare to the non-announcing 
life cycle peers’ returns over the same three days. We find that the average return of non-
announcing life cycle peers increases over earnings surprise deciles 1 to 10. Moreover, the 
difference in the average return of non-announcing life cycle peers in decile 1 and decile 10 ranges 
between 0.081% and 0.156%, which is highly significant and comparable in terms of economic 
magnitude to intra-industry information transfers (Kovacs 2016).  
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Additional tests reveal that information transfers are concentrated among firms in the 
introduction, mature, shakeout, and decline stages, with the economically largest transfers 
occurring between firms in the latter two stages. For these firms, the return differential across life 
cycle peers in decile 1 and decile 10 increases to up to 0.293%. The results are generally weakest, 
both statistically and economically, for firms in the growth stage. These life-cycle specific results 
are generally consistent with Vorst and Yohn (2018) who show the greatest (no) improvement in 
the accuracy of out-of-sample growth and profitability forecasts for firms in the decline (growth) 
stage.   
To investigate the extent to which life cycle information transfers are distinct from transfers 
within industries, we rerun the main analyses restricting the sample to peer firms that are in the 
same life cycle stage, but active in different industries. We find results that are very similar to the 
results reported for the full sample of peers. Specifically, we continue to find a positive and 
significant relation between announcing firms’ earnings announcement returns and the non-
announcing life cycle peers’ same three-day returns. Similarly, when we focus on transfers of 
earnings information, we continue to find that the average returns of non-announcing peer firms 
generally increase from announcing firms’ earnings surprise deciles 1 to 10, with an average non-
announcing life cycle peer return differential between decile 1 and decile 10 of 0.070% to 0.146%. 
Overall, these results show that information transfers within life cycle stages are distinct from and 
incremental to information transfers within industries. Interestingly, whereas these results suggest 
that intra-life cycle information transfers do not depend on whether the life cycle peers are also 
industry peers, we find the opposite when replicating intra-industry information transfers. 
Specifically, we find that intra-industry information transfers are greater when the industry peers 
are also in the same life cycle stage.  
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We also investigate the mechanism by which life cycle information is transferred. Using 
management forecasts, Hilary and Shen (2013) show that analysts play an important role in the 
transfer of industry information between “issuing” firms and other “non-issuing” firms covered by 
the same analyst. Such a role is consistent with the view that analysts possess industry expertise 
(Kadan et al. 2012) and can facilitate information transfers across the firms they cover (Muslu, 
Rebello, and Xu 2014). As shared analyst coverage across the broad set of life cycle pairs is 
limited, it is unlikely that analysts are the main mechanism by which information is transferred 
across firms within the same life cycle stage. In contrast, we expect institutional cross-ownership 
to be an important mechanism by which life cycle information transfers across firms.  
Previous research documents the importance of sophisticated institutional trading for the 
incorporation of (earnings) information into stock prices (Potter 1992; Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and 
Venkatachalam 2002; Hotchkiss and Strickland 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone 2004) and shows 
that overlap in institutional ownership is an important mechanism by which disclosure practices 
diffuse across firms within an industry (Jung 2013). To the extent that these institutions trade on a 
life cycle-wide component in earnings, they may facilitate the transfer of information across life 
cycle peers. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that various institutions specialize in investing in 
firms in specific life cycle stages, while the classical tradeoff between growth versus value 
investing is also reflective of an investing strategy based on a life cycle dimension (growth versus 
mature stage firms). Appendix A provides some specific examples of (institutions with) life cycle-
based investment strategies. 
Our results are consistent with the importance of institutional cross-ownership. We find that 
the magnitude of the information transfers increases in the number of institutional investors that 
own shares in both the announcing firm and the non-announcing life cycle peer. We do not find 
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these results for the number of institutions holding shares in only the announcing firm or the non-
announcing life cycle peer. In addition, we find that cross-holdings by transient institutions have 
a greater impact on the magnitude of intra-life cycle information transfers than cross-holdings by 
long-term institutions, consistent with the concentration of information-based trading activities in 
the former group. This result is consistent with previous literature which finds that mainly transient 
short-term-focused institutions engage in informed trading (Yan and Zhang 2012) and accelerate 
the accurate pricing of earnings information (Ke and Petroni 2004; Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005; 
Collins, Gong, and Hribar 2003). Overall, these results are consistent with (transient) institutional 
trading being an important mechanism by which life cycle information transfers between life cycle 
peers.  
Our primary measure of life cycle stage is based on the classification in Dickinson (2011). 
We find, however, that our results are robust to using various life cycle measures, including 
variations of the original Dickinson (2011) life cycle measure and a life cycle measure following 
Anthony and Ramesh (1992). The robustness of the results to using alternative measures and to 
controlling for (differences in) the operating, financing, and investing cash flows of the announcing 
firm and the peer firm suggests that the results are not driven by the underlying cash flows on 
which the Dickinson (2011) life cycle measure is based.  
Our study contributes to several streams of literature. First, increased attention has recently 
been given to understanding the factors that shape a firm’s earnings generation process, with 
particular importance being attached to understanding the role of economic fundamentals. While 
most of the prior research focuses on industry to address this issue, several studies question the 
assumption of intra-industry homogeneity and argue that by relying on industry only, one ignores 
many of the underlying economic factors that drive firm fundamentals (e.g., Owens, Wu, and 
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Zimmerman 2017). Our study adds to this literature by documenting the importance of firm life 
cycle as a relevant factor driving a firm’s fundamentals.  
Second, by investigating information transfers around earnings disclosures, we document 
the extent to which investors use within-life cycle commonalities in pricing (peer) firms. Our study 
adds evidence on the usefulness of accounting disclosures, with a particular focus on 
understanding the usefulness of a life cycle component of earnings. Our findings on the role of 
institutional cross-holdings provide further evidence on the types of investors that use life cycle 
information as well as the mechanism by which life cycle information spills over between firms in 
the same life cycle stage. As such, these results also contribute to the literature on information 
spillovers, by showing when and how life cycle information spills over.  
Finally, the study contributes to the literature on firm life cycle by showing that there are 
commonalities across firms in a life cycle stage and by showing that such commonalities are 
recognized by (institutional) investors and strong enough to warrant detectable information 
transfers. Combined with the findings in the prior literature (Vorst and Yohn 2018; Drake and 
Martin 2018), our results are consistent with a potential role for firm life cycle in the identification 
of comparable peer firms for multiple-based valuation. This study, therefore, provides further 
evidence on the role of firm life cycle in the valuation process.  
II. LIFE CYCLE AND INFORMATION TRANSFERS 
Firm Life Cycle 
While research on firm life cycle is relatively new to the accounting literature, firm life cycle has 
long been recognized as a major construct in the organization literature, which captures a firm’s 
development over time as well as the internal and external factors that shape and reflect such 
development. For example, in one of the seminal studies on firm life cycle, Miller and Friesen 
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(1984) show that firms within a life cycle stage have complementarities in their strategies, 
structures, decision-making styles, and the external environment they face, while these aspects are 
different from firms in the other life cycle stages.  
Other studies document an abundance of internal and external factors that vary 
systematically across the life cycle stages. For example, with respect to internal factors, studies 
show that organizational life cycle is associated with the criteria for organizational effectiveness 
(Quinn and Cameron 1983), the formality of management accounting systems (Moores and Yuen 
2001), the use of activity-based costing systems (Kallunki and Silvola 2008), types of management 
controls used (Granlund and Taipaleenmäki 2005; Su, Baird, and Schoch 2015), the structure 
needed to support innovation (Koberg, Uhlenbruck, and Sarason 1996; Hanks, Watson, Jansen, 
and Chandler 1994), the benefits from corporate social responsibility activities (Wang and Bansal 
2012), and the level of sophistication of decision-making processes (Miller and Friesen 1983). 
Similarly, with respect to external factors, studies document systematic differences in stakeholder 
importance (Jawahar and McLaughlin 2001), organizational networks (Hite and Hesterly 2001), 
hostility (Adizes 1979), and the competitiveness and structure of the market (Gort and Klepper 
1982; Klepper 1996) across firms in different life cycle stages.  
As firms develop and move through the different life cycle stages, this will bring about 
predictable changes in these internal and external factors. The importance of firm life cycle lies in 
the fact that it is rarely only one of these factors that changes when firms develop. Instead, many 
factors change simultaneously over the course of a firm’s life. As such, firm life cycle is a 
multifaceted construct that captures the complex interplay between each of these factors, which is 
something that cannot be observed by looking at these factors in isolation.   
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More directly related to the implications of firm life cycle to investors, prior studies show 
that firm life cycle is an important factor to consider in gaining an understanding of the financial 
performance of a firm (Dickinson 2011). For example, Hribar and Yehuda (2015) show that firm 
life cycle affects the behavior of accruals and has implications for the accrual anomaly. Other 
studies show that firm life cycle affects the value-relevance of accounting measures, as well as 
their relative importance in an investor’s information set (Anthony and Ramesh 1992; Dickinson, 
Kassa, and Schaberl 2018), or show that life cycle information can be used to analyze and predict 
a firm’s financial performance (Dickinson 2011; Cantrell and Dickinson 2018; Vorst and Yohn 
2018). Overall, these studies show the importance of firm life cycle as a determinant of firm 
decision making, a firm’s earnings-generating process, and the information attributes relevant to 
investors.  
Life Cycle and Information Transfers 
Studies on intra-industry information transfers typically argue that information released by one 
firm is useful in valuing other firms in the same industry as the performance of all firms is, to some 
extent, affected by industry-wide factors. For example, if firm i reports earnings that are above 
expectations because of higher than expected industry growth, this is also relevant for valuing 
other firms in the industry, as they are likely affected by the same factors that drove up industry 
growth. Following the previous discussion and the similarities across firms in a life cycle stage, 
we argue that it is likely that there are information transfers across firms within a life cycle stage 
as well.  
Previous research documents persistent differences in firm performance across the life cycle 
stages (Dickinson 2011) and shows that the degree of mean-reversion differs depending on the life 
cycle stage of the firm (Vorst and Yohn 2018). Hence, as firms within a life cycle stage have 
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similar performance dynamics, information releases of one firm can spill over to other firms in the 
same life cycle stage as in response to the announcing firm’s earnings release investors also update 
their beliefs about the performance of life cycle peers. Similarly, Hribar and Yehuda (2015) show 
that the role of accounting accruals (i.e., whether they capture investments in future growth or 
mainly adjust for the timing of cash flows) varies across firms depending on their life cycle stage. 
As such, as the role of accruals is similar (different) within (across) life cycle stages, information 
releases by one firm can help investors to determine the extent to which the investment-related and 
other accruals of other firms in the same life cycle stage translate into future growth and cash 
flows. Finally, Anthony and Ramesh (1992) show that how the market responds to accounting 
disclosures also depends on the life cycle stage of the firm.1 Collectively, these studies thus suggest 
a systematic life cycle component in accounting information and the way in which it is processed 
by investors. Consequently, we expect that information can spill over across life cycle peers.   
A variety of other decisions and organizational challenges and risks also differ depending on 
the life cycle stage of the firm (Miller and Friesen 1984; Kazanjian 1988). The risks and challenges 
faced by a growth firm are likely substantially different from those of a decline stage firm that 
aims to prevent bankruptcy. Similarly, while overinvestment is a key concern for cash-generating 
mature firms with limited growth opportunities, underinvestment is a greater concern for earlier 
stage firms that can face difficulties in obtaining sufficient capital. As an illustration, consider 
Uber and Airbnb, two firms in the introduction stage. Despite the fact that both firms are active in 
completely different product markets (taxi/transportation versus tourism/hospitality), both firms 
face similar challenges. For example, consistent with Adizes (1979), both Uber and Airbnb were 
                                                          
1 Specifically, they find that unexpected sales growth and capital expenditures are perceived as more beneficial for 
earlier stage firms that still aim to create a permanent competitive advantage and for which investments are, on 
average, creating more value.   
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confronted with increased levels of hostility and resistance once the business grew and began to 
eat away market share of (traditional) incumbent firms. Similarly, both firms make heavy 
investments in marketing expenses to attract customers to their platform, something that will 
translate into similar performance dynamics, despite being active in different industries. A similar 
argument can be made for the mature firms that are confronted with such new entrants and are 
likely to respond in a similar fashion. It should be noted that these similarities are not limited to 
tech-firms. For example, the issues faced by Tesla in attempting to scale the business are 
widespread across the economy and can be found in many other early-stage firms as well. 
Similarly, many of Tesla’s governance issues are typical for early-stage firms that move from 
concentrated ownership to being widely held (see for example Uber as well).  
Finally, broader economy-wide factors, likely affect firms within the same life cycle stage 
similarly. For example, a shift in (risk-free) interest rates has a different effect on introduction and 
growth companies who suddenly see discount rates rise and investment opportunities decline, 
compared to mature firms whose valuation is much less dependent on future realizations of 
(earnings) growth. Similarly, such changes in interest rates can have a systematic effect on 
financially troubled decline stage firms who see a change in the ability and cost of raising new 
financing. Hence, if such effects are systematic and affect firms within life cycle stages similarly, 
investors who observe the impact on the performance and growth opportunities of one firm can 
make useful inferences about how this will affect other firms in the same life cycle stage.    
It should be noted that the literature on intra-industry information transfers typically 
distinguishes between positive and negative information transfers. Most studies find positive 
information transfers within an industry on average, suggesting that the good performance of one 
firm reveals a favorable industry environment for the industry peers as well. We also expect intra-
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life cycle information transfers to be mostly positive in nature as the broad range of firms within a 
life cycle stage is less likely to be in direct competition with one another.  
III. LIFE CYCLE COMMONALITIES 
We begin our analyses by investigating whether firms in the same life cycle stage have greater 
accounting comparability and greater similarity in their underlying economics than other firms. 
We use the measure developed in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011) to capture accounting 
comparability. We measure synchronicity in return on assets, sales, and capital expenditures to 
capture the similarity in accounting fundamentals. We take the natural logarithm of the R-squared 
of a regression of the quarterly return on assets, sales, or capital expenditures of firm i on the 
quarterly return on assets, sales, or capital expenditures of firm j over the three-year period (i.e., 
12 quarters) that ends at fiscal year-end, requiring a minimum of six quarterly observations.2 
Finally, we also measure stock return synchronicity as a broader measure of synchronicity that 
does not only rely on similarity in accounting constructs. Stock price synchronicity is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the R-squared of a regression of daily stock returns of firm i on the daily 
stock returns of firm j, over the 12 month period in fiscal year t.  
We investigate whether comparability and synchronicity are higher if both firms in the pair 
are in the same life cycle stage (SameLC). We examine two different samples. The first sample 
includes all possible firm-pairs regardless of whether the firms are in the same industry. This 
sample allows us to investigate whether, after controlling for whether the firms in the firm-pair are 
in the same industry (Fama French 48 industries; SameFF48), firm-pairs in the same life cycle 
stage experience higher comparability and synchronicity. The second sample is restricted to firm-
                                                          
2 Following the (stock price) synchronicity literature we take the natural logarithm of the R-squared and calculate 
synchronicity as: log[RSQ/(1-RSQ)].  
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pairs in which both firms are in the same industry. This sample allows us to investigate whether, 
conditional on being in the same industry, firms in the same life cycle stage experience 
incrementally higher comparability and synchronicity.  
We control for various other determinants of accounting comparability and (performance) 
synchronicity and include an indicator variable that captures whether the firms are listed on the 
same stock exchange (SameEX) or are headquartered in the same state (SameST). We further 
control for absolute differences in firm age (Diff_AGE), return on assets (Diff_ROA), earnings per 
share (Diff_EPS), book-to-market ratio’s (Diff_BTM), leverage (Diff_LEV), (log) assets (Diff_AT), 
intangible asset intensity (Diff_INT), employee intensity (Diff_EMP), stock price (Diff_PCR), 
sales growth (Diff_GRW), (log) market value of equity (Diff_MVE) and cash flows (Diff_CFO, 
Diff_CFF, and Diff_CFI). We further control for firm size (log assets) and accounting performance 
(return of assets) of both firms in the pair and include industry and year fixed effects. We cluster 
standard errors at the firm level.  
[TABLE 1] 
The results reported in Table 1 provide strong evidence that firm-pairs in the same life cycle stage 
experience greater similarities in their accounting policies as well as their underlying economics 
than other firm-pairs. We find a positive and significant relation between SameLC and accounting 
comparability, return on asset synchronicity, sales synchronicity, capital expenditure 
synchronicity, and return synchronicity in all specifications, for both the full sample and the 
restricted sample of industry peers. While being in the same industry is positively associated with 
return on assets, sales, and stock return synchronicity, there is no such association for synchronicity 
in capital expenditures. Interestingly, being in the same life cycle stage is a more important 
determinant of accounting comparability than being in the same industry (SameLC coef. 0.440; 
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SameFF48 coef. 0.114).  Results on the control variables are as expected, with most of the firm-
pair differences loading negatively on comparability and synchronicity. Overall, these results 
document similarities across firms within the same life cycle stage and provide evidence that these 
similarities are present for many aspects relevant to investors including accounting measurements, 
operating performance (return on assets and sales), investments and/or cost structures (capex), and 
stock returns. As such, these similarities illustrate how accounting information of one firm can be 
relevant in valuing other firms in the same life cycle stage.  
IV. INFORMATION TRANSFER RESEARCH DESIGN 
The information transfer sample includes all quarterly earnings announcements in the Compustat-
CRSP merged file over the period 1987 to 2017 for US firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ.3 To assure that all firms in a fiscal quarter report over a similar period, following prior 
literature, we delete observations that do not have a December fiscal year-end. We further drop 
financial and utility firms (sic 6000-6999 and 4600-4699) and require firm-quarters to have a non-
missing Fama French 48 Industry code. To obtain the earnings surprise, we further require a 
minimum of one quarterly analyst earnings forecast issued in the 90-day period prior to the 
earnings announcement in the unadjusted I/B/E/S Summary file.  
To measure firm life cycle, we follow Dickinson (2011) and classify firms into five different 
stages, Introduction, Growth, Mature, Shakeout, and Decline, based on the signs of a firm’s 
operating, investing, and financing cash flows. As such, the measure directly reflects the 
theoretical links between cash flows and firm life cycle and, consistent with what has been found 
in the organization literature, allows firms to move back and forth across the stages and allows for 
                                                          
3 The sample starts in 1987 as this is the first year for which cash flow data are available in Compustat, albeit on a 
limited basis. Broader cash flow coverage starts in 1988.  
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extreme transitions (i.e., from introduction to decline). Although the subsequent tests use quarterly 
data, to eliminate the impact of seasonality on the observed cash flow patterns, we calculate firm 
life cycle using annual cash flow data and assign the resulting life cycle stage to all fiscal quarters 
of the year. Firm-years with missing life cycle information are deleted.4    
Finally, we require firms to have a non-missing earnings announcement date and a non-
missing earnings announcement return. To obtain the earnings announcement date, we follow 
Kovacs (2016) and use a combination of I/B/E/S and Compustat information. Specifically, if 
available, we use the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date and time and set the event date equal to 
the I/B/E/S announcement date (the trading day following the I/B/E/S announcement date) if the 
earnings announcement time is listed as being before (on or after) 4pm. If the earnings 
announcement date in I/B/E/S is missing, we use the Compustat earnings announcement date 
(RDQ) and trading volume data from CRSP to determine the event date. Specifically, we set the 
event date equal to RDQ, unless the trading volume on the trading day following RDQ is at least 
twice the trading volume on RDQ, in which case we pick the trading day following RDQ as the 
event date.       
We use the three-day cumulative abnormal return centered around the earnings 
announcement date (-1,0,+1) to capture the market reaction to a firm’s earnings release. We use 
both market-adjusted and size-adjusted returns. Whereas most studies on information transfers use 
                                                          
4 We use the following classification table to assign firm-year observations to the distinct life cycle stages (retrieved 
from: Dickinson 2011, p. 1974):   
 Life Cycle Stages  
  Introduction  Growth  Mature  Shakeout  Decline  
Cash Flow Type  1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  
Operating Activities  -  +  +  -  +  +  -  -  
Investing Activities  -  -  -  -  +  +  +  +  





market-adjusted returns, investigating whether the results are sensitive to the use of size-adjusted 
returns is important as size is an important driver of expected returns (Fama and French 1993) and 
can vary significantly across the life cycle stages. Abnormal returns are calculated as follows:     
ARET_MKADJitd = RETitd - MKRETitd               (1) 
ARET_SZADJitd = RETitd - SZRETitd                (2) 
Where RET is the daily raw return, MKRET is the daily return on the value-weighted CRSP market 
index, and SZRET is the daily return on a portfolio of firms in the same NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
size decile. Cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated as follows:   
CAR_MKADJ = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑇_𝑀𝐾𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑑= −1,0,+1𝑖,𝑞                          (3) 
CAR_SZADJ = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑇_𝑆𝑍𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑑= −1,0,+1𝑖,𝑞               (4) 
Observations with missing announcement returns are deleted. Table 2 reports the sample selection 
process and the number of observations dropped after each of the steps described above.   
[TABLE 2] 
To investigate the presence of intra-life cycle information transfers we need to (1) select a group 
of announcing firms and (2) select a set of non-announcing life cycle peers. Previous literature on 
intra-industry information transfers finds that primarily large firms disclose information that is 
relevant to the valuation of peer firms (Asthana and Mishra 2001). Consequently, research (e.g., 
Kovacs 2016) focuses on large announcing firms for the identification of intra-industry 
information transfers. Following the prior research, we select the 25 largest firms by sales in a 
fiscal quarter and life cycle stage as a set of firms that report information that is relevant to the 
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valuation of life cycle peers.5 To obtain the set of non-announcing life cycle peers, we select all 
firms in the same life cycle stage and fiscal quarter that do not have a concurrent earnings 
announcement. Specifically, we drop peer firms if they announce earnings on the same day or the 
two trading days prior to or following the announcing firms’ earnings release date (-2,0,+2). We 
then calculate the peer firm three-day cumulative abnormal return around the earnings 
announcement of the announcing firm to which it is matched following the methodology described 
above.   
V. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the full sample, the subsample of large announcing firms 
used in the analyses, as well as their life cycle peers. For the full sample, most firms are in the 
growth or the mature stage (33.7% and 39.2%, respectively), while the lowest percentage of firms 
is in the decline stage (6.5%). Relatively few firms are listed on the AMEX and the median (mean) 
level of quarterly sales is $112 million ($690 million). Driven by the requirement to have at least 
one analyst forecast, there is a relatively high level of analyst following, with on average more 
than six analysts issuing a quarterly earnings forecast. The average announcement CAR is close to 
zero, possibly indicating that in the cross-section of announcements, good and bad news cancel 
out. 
[TABLE 3] 
The descriptive statistics of the large announcing firms (top 25 by sales) reveal a few noteworthy 
differences. Given that we select the 25 largest firms (as measured by sales) in a life cycle stage 
                                                          
5 Results are robust to using different size cutoffs and selecting, for example, the 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 largest firms in 
a fiscal quarter and life cycle stage.  
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every quarter, the number of announcing firms in each stage is roughly equal to around 20 percent 
of the sample. Moreover, these large firms report average quarterly sales of close to $4.2 billion, 
compared to $690 million for all firms. They have higher analyst coverage (9.994 versus 6.233), 
are more profitable (ROA of 0.003 versus -0.005), and are less likely to be loss-making (27.2% 
versus 30.7%). Finally, the focus on large firms biases the sample towards firms listed on the 
NYSE (78% versus 45%).  
Not surprisingly, the descriptive statistics of the sample of life cycle peers are very similar 
to those of the full sample. Most peer firms are in the growth and the mature stage, while the lowest 
percentage of peer firms is in the decline stage. The average peer return around an announcing 
firm’s earnings announcement is indistinguishable from zero, but the standard deviation of 0.060 
reveals that there is considerable variation in the returns.6      
Life Cycle Information Transfers – Full Sample 
Table 4, Panel A presents the results of a regression of announcing firms’ earnings announcement 
CARs on the three-day returns of peer firms in the same life cycle stage, with standard errors 
clustered at the peer firm level. If the announcing firm releases information that is relevant to the 
valuation of peer firms in the same life cycle stage, the returns of the two firms should be 
correlated. The results show a positive and significant relation between announcing firm CARs 
and peer firm returns over the same window using both market-adjusted (coef. 0.01208, t-stat 
18.15) and size-adjusted (coef. 0.00822, t-stat 11.79) returns. These findings provide the first 
evidence of positive intra-life cycle information transfers. However, while these results provide 
evidence of commonalities between announcing firms and life cycle peers, they do not speak to 
                                                          
6 In the main tests, we do not winsorize or truncate returns, however, results are robust to either truncating or 
winsorizing returns at the 1st and 99th percentile.  
19 
 
which type of information is transferred across firms. Hence, we next investigate whether there 
are transfers associated with the release of earnings information.  
To investigate earnings-related intra-life cycle information transfers, we first calculate, for 
each announcing firm, an analyst forecast-based earnings surprise. Specifically, the earnings 
surprise is calculated as the firm’s actual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S, less the latest analyst 
consensus (mean) forecast issued prior to the end of the fiscal quarter, scaled by the stock price at 
the end of the fiscal quarter. We then create a quarterly decile rank (SD) of the scaled analyst 
forecast error and investigate whether the returns of life cycle peer firms vary systematically with 
the announcing firms’ earnings surprise decile. The results are reported in Table 4, Panel B.  
[TABLE 4] 
Not surprisingly, the announcing firms’ earnings announcement CARs are increasing 
monotonically from decile 1 to decile 10. However, what is striking is the strong correlation 
between life cycle peer firms’ returns and the announcing firms’ CARs. Non-announcing life cycle 
peers’ returns are generally increasing, although not monotonically, from earning surprise deciles 
1 to 10. When we regress the earnings surprise decile rank on the average return of the life cycle 
peers in the decile we find a significantly positive relation between the announcing firms’ earnings 
surprise decile rank and the average return of life cycle-matched peer firms. Finally, we also test 
whether the returns of the life cycle peers in decile 10 are significantly higher than the returns of 
the life cycle peers in decile 1. The results again confirm the existence of intra-life cycle 
information transfers, with a market-adjusted (size-adjusted) return differential between decile 1 
and decile 10 of 0.156% (0.081%). These results are economically significant and comparable in 
terms of magnitude to what the previous literature documents for intra-industry information 
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transfers. Overall, the results reported in Table 4, Panels A and B, provide strong evidence of intra-
life cycle information transfers.  
Thus far, the results suggest that there are economically strong information transfers across 
announcing firms and their non-announcing life cycle peers. We next investigate whether these 
results differ conditional on the life cycle stage of the firm. For each of the life cycle stages, we 
create subsamples of announcing and non-announcing peers and test whether the returns of non-
announcing life cycle peers in decile 10 are significantly higher than those of non-announcing life 
cycle peers in decile 1. The results are reported in Table 4, Panel C. We find the strongest results 
for firms in the mature, shakeout, and decline stages, with decile hedge returns that are positive 
and significant. We find that the economically largest transfers are for firms in the shakeout and 
decline stages. For example, for firms in the shakeout (decline) stage, the difference in returns 
between decile 1 and decile 10 ranges between 0.173% and 0.270% (0.201% and 0.293%), which 
is up to three times the magnitude reported in the full sample. We find weaker results for firms in 
the introduction stage for which the difference between the returns in decile 10 and decile 1 is 
significant only when using market-adjusted returns. We do not find evidence of information 
transfers for firms in the growth stage.  
In summary, we find that there are economically strong information transfers across firms 
within a life cycle stage. While we find evidence of information transfers in the majority of the life 
cycle stages, their magnitude varies considerably across the stages. The result that transfers are 
generally greatest for firms in the decline stage and absent for firms in the growth stage is also in 
line with prior literature. For example, Vorst and Yohn (2018) show that while life cycle models 
improve the accuracy of out-of-sample growth and profitability forecasts for firms in most of the 
life cycle stages, the biggest (smallest) improvements are for firms in the decline (growth) stage. 
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Although speculative, one explanation for the weaker results for firms in the growth stage could 
be that earnings information (and by extension the earnings surprise) is less relevant for the firms 
in this stage.   
 [TABLE 5] 
Table 5 presents the results of regression analyses that include control variables. Specifically, we 
restrict the sample to (peer) firms in earnings surprise deciles 1 and 10 and create an indicator 
variable, Low_Decile, which is equal to one for life cycle peers matched to an announcing firm in 
decile 1, and zero for peers matched to announcing firms in decile 10.7 We control for (peer) firm 
characteristics that can drive both their life cycle assignment and the abnormal announcement 
return. We control for firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s end-of-quarter 
market capitalization (PRCCQ*CSHOQ; MVE, Peer_MVE), as firm size differs conditional on a 
firm’s life cycle stage and prior studies (Fama and French 1993) find that size is an important 
factor explaining the cross-section of returns. Similarly, the use of leverage (DLTTQ + DLCQ / 
ATQ; Lev, Peer_Lev) likely depends on a firm’s life cycle stage and can also determine a firm’s 
risk and (expected) returns. We also control for the firm’s book-to-market ratio (SEQQ / 
[PRCCQ*CSHOQ]; BTM, Peer_BTM) as growth opportunities vary by life cycle stage and many 
studies find differences in the returns of value and glamour stocks (Fama and French 1993; 
Piotroski and So 2012). Finally, we control for a firm’s quarterly performance (IBQ/ lag ATQ; 
ROA, Peer_ROA) and for whether the firm is loss-making (IBQ<0; Loss, Peer_Loss) as the 
informativeness of accounting disclosures is different for loss firms (Hayn 1995).  
                                                          
7 The results are not sensitive to restricting the sample to (peer) firms in the top and bottom decile of scaled analyst 
earnings surprises. We find similar results when we do not restrict the sample and estimate a regression of peer 
announcement returns on the decile rank of scaled analyst earnings surprises.  
22 
 
One concern with the tests reported thus far is that the information transfers we document 
may not be related to firm life cycle, but rather to the (magnitudes of the) underlying cash flows 
itself. To mitigate this concern, we control for the (peer) firms’ quarterly cash flow levels (OANCF 
/ lag ATQ, Peer_CFO; FINCF / lag ATQ, Peer_CFF; IVNCF / lag ATQ, Peer_CFI), as well as 
the absolute differences in announcing and peer firms’ annual cash flows (Diff_CFO, Diff_CFF, 
Diff_CFI).8 We further include year, fiscal quarter, and industry (Fama French 48) fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at peer firm level and we present results using both market-adjusted 
and size-adjusted returns. Table 5, Column (1) and (2) present results controlling for the fixed 
effects only, while in subsequent columns different sets of controls are added to the regression 
specification. The final columns also control for life cycle stage fixed effects. The regression 
specification is as follows: 
Peer_CAR = α + β1Low_Decile + β2MVE + β3Peer_MVE + β4Lev + β5Peer_Lev + β6BTM + 
β7Peer_BTM + β8ROA+ β9Peer_ROA + β10Loss + β11Peer_Loss + β12CFO + β3CFF 
+ β14CFI + β15Peer_CFO + β16Peer_CFF + β17Peer_CFI + β18Diff_CFO + 
β19Diff_CFF + β20Diff_CFI + Year FE + Industry FE + Fiscal Quarter FE + Life Cycle 
FE + ε                 (5)   
As can be seen from the results, adding controls has little effect on the economic and statistical 
significance of Low_Decile. The coefficient on Low_Decile is negative and highly significant in 
all specifications. The coefficient ranges between -0.001 and -0.002, indicating that peer firms 
matched to announcing firms in the low earnings surprise decile have concurrent returns that are 
lower by -0.10% to -0.20%. Given that these firms themselves do not have any major 
                                                          
8 We control for the absolute difference in annual cash flows because we use those to determine a firm’s life cycle. 
We include both announcing and peer firms’ quarterly cash flows in the regression.  
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announcement, these results are further indicative of economically strong intra-life cycle 
information transfers.  
Life Cycle Information Transfers – Non-Aligned Industries 
The results reported thus far are based on the full sample of firms that includes life cycle peers that 
are active in the same industry as the announcing firm. To investigate whether the intra-life cycle 
information transfers are distinct from and incremental to intra-industry information transfers, we 
rerun the main tests on a sample of firms that excludes life cycle peers that are active in the same 
industry as the announcing firm. Specifically, we delete life cycle peers if they have the same Fama 
French 48 code as the announcing firm. The results are reported in Table 6 and Table 7, which 
reproduce the findings reported in Table 4 and Table 5, but on the restricted sample. The results 
are very similar to those reported on the full sample, both statistically and economically, 
suggesting that the intra-life cycle information transfers documented in the full sample are not 
driven by, and are distinct from, intra-industry information transfers. Untabulated tests reveal 
similar findings using alternative industry definitions. Specifically, the results are robust to 
dropping life cycle peers in the same two-digit historical sic code, six-digit GICS code, and 
deleting firms that are listed as an announcing firm’s industry peer based on the similarity of the 
product market descriptions in their 10-K’s (Hoberg and Phillips 2010, 2016).   
[TABLE 6] 
[TABLE 7] 
Life Cycle and Intra-Industry Information Transfers 
Previous studies on information transfers have almost exclusively focused on the transfer of 
industry information. Although the previous results suggest that the intra-life cycle information 
transfers we document are distinct from intra-industry information transfers, we explore the role 
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of firm life cycle in the transfer of industry information. Specifically, we test whether intra-
industry information transfers are greater when firms within an industry also have the same life 
cycle stage. The general idea underlying the transfer of information within an industry is that better 
than expected performance of one firm reveals a favorable industry environment that also benefits 
the other firms in the industry. However, this may also depend on the life cycle stage of the firm. 
For example, whereas the good performance of a growth firm can reflect beneficial growth 
dynamics for other (disruptive) growth firms within the industry, it may come at the expense of 
the performance of stable mature stage firms. In this example, one would expect positive 
information transfers for industry peers that are both in the growth stage, while there would be no 
or a negative transfer between a growth stage announcing firm and its mature stage peer firm.  
[TABLE 8] 
We begin by replicating prior studies on intra-industry information transfers in Table 8, Panel A. 
Consistent with the prior literature, we find evidence of information transfers at the industry level. 
In fact, the decile hedge return of non-announcing industry peers of 0.2158% to 0.2413% is 
considerably larger than the 0.1129% reported in Kovacs (2016). In Table 8, Panel B, we partition 
the sample of industry peers into two groups depending on whether the two firms are in the same 
life cycle stage and compare the decile hedge return across the two subsamples. We find that intra-
industry information transfers are larger when industry peers also share the same life cycle stage. 
Whereas the market-adjusted (size-adjusted) hedge return is equal to 0.316% (0.273%) for industry 
peers in the same life cycle stage, it is only 0.202% (0.186%) for industry peers in different life 
cycle stages, with the difference being significant at the five (ten) percent significance level, two-
tailed. Overall, these results document a role for firm life cycle in intra-industry information 




Next, we investigate the mechanism by which life cycle information is transferred from large 
announcing firms to non-announcing life cycle peers. Previous literature on intra-industry 
information transfers has explored the role of analyst (cross-) coverage in the transfers of industry-
wide information. For example, Hilary and Shen (2013) find that when a firm issues a management 
forecast, analysts who have experience in covering the issuing firm also improve the accuracy of 
their earnings forecasts for other non-issuing firms in the same industry. This finding suggests that 
analysts use relevant industry information in the issuing firm’s management forecast to update 
their forecasts for the other firms they cover in the same industry.  
However, analyst cross-coverage is very limited in the broad set of announcing firms and 
their life cycle peers. Hence, it is unlikely that analyst cross-coverage and the resulting information 
spillovers are the main mechanism by which life cycle information is transferred. In contrast, we 
focus on the role of institutional cross-holdings as a factor that may affect the magnitude of intra-
life cycle information transfers. There is a large literature that explores the role of institutions in 
the production of private information and the incorporation of public information into stock prices. 
For example, Jiambalvo et al. (2002) find that stock prices incorporate more information on future-
period earnings for firms in which institutions own a greater percentage of the shares. Similarly, 
Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) find that the short-term market reaction to negative earnings 
surprises is more complete for stocks with higher institutional ownership, while Bartov, 
Radhakrishnan, and Krinksky (2000) find evidence of a smaller post-earnings announcement drift 
for stocks owned by institutions. Overall, these studies provide evidence of greater price efficiency 
for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership.  
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There is also anecdotal evidence that suggests that (institutional) investors incorporate life 
cycle information into their investment decisions or develop trading strategies and portfolios 
centered on certain life cycle stages. For example, venture capital investors specialize in investing 
in younger and faster growing introduction and growth stage firms. Similarly, institutions that 
employ a smart beta or factor approach often create exposure to a growth or value factor by 
investing in a portfolio of introduction and growth or mature firms, respectively. Appendix A 
provides some examples of institutions that use investment strategies centered on firms in a 
particular life cycle stage. These examples also illustrate that life cycle based investment strategies 
are much broader than creating exposure to growth or mature firms only, but instead encompass 
the entire universe of life cycle stages.   
Given that we are interested in the transfer of information from announcing firms to non-
announcing life cycle peers, we focus on the role of institutional cross-holdings, i.e., the extent to 
which the announcing firm and the life cycle peer have common institutional ownership. The 
importance of overlap in institutional owners has been documented in other settings. For example, 
Jung (2013) finds that an increase in disclosures provided by one firm triggers other firms in the 
industry to increase their disclosures. This effect is positively associated with the overlap in 
institutional investors as the overlapping institutions demand similar disclosures of the previously 
non-disclosing industry peers. Specifically related to our setting, we argue that institutions that 
own shares in both firms should be better able to understand the implications of the life cycle 
information in the announcing firm’s earnings announcement for the valuation of the peer firm. 
Moreover, as they own shares in both firms, it is more likely that they also actively trade on the 




To investigate whether institutional cross-holdings affect the magnitude of intra-life cycle 
information transfers, we estimate the following model: 
Peer_CAR = α + β1Low_Decile +  β2Inst_Overlap + β3Low*Inst_Overlap + β4Inst_Announce + 
β5Low*Inst_Announce + β6Inst_Peer + β7Low*Inst_Peer + β8MVE + β9Low*MVE + 
β10Peer_MVE + β11Low*Peer_MVE + β12Follow + β13Low*Follow + β14Peer_Follow + 
β15Low*Peer_Follow + β16BTM + β17Low*BTM + β18Peer_BTM + β19Low*Peer_BTM + β20Lev 
+ β21Low*Lev + β22Peer_Lev + β23Low*Peer_Lev +  β24ROA + β25Low*ROA + β26Peer_ROA + 
β27Low*Peer_ROA + β28Loss + β29Low*Loss + β30Peer_Loss + β31Low*Peer_Loss + Year FE + 
Industry FE + Fiscal Quarter FE + ε                                                                                                                               (6)   
Where Inst_Overlap is equal to the number of institutions that own shares in both the announcing 
firm and the peer firm, Inst_Announce is the number of institutions that own shares in the 
announcing firm but not the peer firm, and Inst_Peer is the number of institutions that own shares 
in the peer firm, but not the announcement firm. As we expect that institutional cross-holdings are 
positively associated with intra-life cycle information transfers, we expect the coefficient on the 
interaction of Low_Decile and Inst_Overlap (β3) to be significantly negative. Given that we are 
interested in the interaction effect of Low_Decile and Inst_Overlap, we also include interactions 
of all of the control variables with Low_Decile to better isolate the effect of institutional overlap 
on the magnitude of the intra-life cycle information transfers. We do not include the number of 
cross-covering analysts as a control variable because the vast majority of the firm-peer 
combinations (>99%) have no analyst cross-coverage. However, we do include the number of 
analysts that cover the announcing firm (Follow) or the peer firm (Peer_Follow), as well as their 
interactions with Low_Decile, as control variables. All other variables are as defined before. 




The results are reported in Table 9. The results reported in column (1) and (2) are consistent with 
an important role for institutional investors in the transfer of life cycle information from 
announcing firms to non-announcing life cycle peers. Specifically, we find a negative and 
significant interaction effect of Low_Decile and Inst_Overlap, indicating that the magnitude of 
information transfers is increasing in the number of institutions that own shares in both the 
announcing firm and the life cycle peer firm. These results are also economically significant as a 
one-standard-deviation increase in Inst_Overlap is associated with a -0.06 % lower return for peer 
firms matched to announcing firms in the low earnings surprise decile. In contrast, we do not find 
that analyst coverage (at either the announcing firm or the peer firm) is associated with stronger 
intra-life cycle information transfers.      
Prior research finds that mostly transient short-term focused institutions engage in informed 
trading (Bushee 1998; Yan and Zhang 2012; Akins, Ng, and Verdi 2012). Hence, the impact of 
institutional investors on stock price informativeness mostly comes from these actively trading 
short-term focused institutions. For example, Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) show that the 
reduction in post-earnings announcement drift for firms with higher levels of institutional 
ownership is driven by the subset of transient institutional owners. Similarly, Collins, Gong, and 
Hribar (2003) find that institutional ownership is associated with less accrual mispricing, but only 
for firms with a sufficiently high level of actively trading (i.e., transient) institutions.  
The results in columns (3) to (8) are generally consistent with the importance of transient 
institutional owners for the transfer of life cycle information. Column (3) to (6) estimate separate 
regressions with the number of transient and long-term institutional owners and show that the 
coefficient on Low*Inst_Overlap is significantly greater (i.e., more negative) for transient owners 
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than for long-term institutional owners, providing the first evidence on the greater relative 
importance of transient institutions for information transfers. Columns (7) and (8) present results 
conditional on the number of transient institutions with cross-holdings as a percentage of all 
institutions with cross-holdings. Specifically, we include interactions between the number of 
institutions with cross-holdings and the percentage of those that are transient (Pct_Trs_Overlap). 
Similarly, we include interactions of the number of institutions with holdings in the announcing or 
peer firm only and the percentage of those that are transient (Pct_Trs_Announce; Pct_Trs_Peer). 
The three-way interaction of Low_Decile, Inst_Overlap, and Pct_Trs_Overlap captures the 
incremental impact of having a greater percentage of transient institutions. Although significant 
only when using size-adjusted returns, the results indicate that information transfers are greater 
when transient institutions make up a larger percentage of all institutions with cross-holdings.9 
Overall, the results are consistent with Collins, Gong, and Hribar (2003) and provide further 
evidence that actively trading transient institutions that invest in both the announcing firm and the 
peer firm are an important mechanism by which information spills over from announcing firms to 
their life cycle peers.  
Robustness Tests 
Alternative Life Cycle Measure 
Although the cash flow-based life cycle measure is closely aligned with life cycle theory, a 
potential concern is that the information transfers we document are not related to firm life cycle, 
but rather to the (signs) of the underlying cash flows. Although in the regression specifications, 
                                                          
9 In an additional (untabulated) test we re-estimate equation (6) and include simultaneously the number of transient 
and dedicated (overlapping) institutional owners and their interactions with Low_Decile. We find that the coefficient 
on Low_Decile*Inst_Overlap is significantly negative for transient institutions and positive and insignificant for 
dedicated institutions, providing further evidence that it is the transient institutions that are associated with a greater 
transfer of life cycle information.  
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we control for (differences in) the various cash flows and still find strong evidence of intra-life 
cycle information transfers, we nevertheless test the robustness of our results with a measure that 
does not rely on cash flow data. We use a life cycle measure based on Anthony and Ramesh (1992) 
as adjusted by Hribar and Yehuda (2015). Specifically, we classify firms into three life cycle stages 
(growth, maturity, and decline) based on sales growth over the last two years, capital expenditures 
(CapEx plus R&D expense, scaled by total assets), net capital transactions (change in total 
stockholders’ equity less net income, scaled by total assets), and firm age. We standardize and sum 
each of these variables (sales growth + capex + net capital transactions – firm age) and create a 
tercile rank to assign firms to a life cycle stage.  
[TABLE 10] 
The results are reported in Table 10. We continue to find evidence of a, albeit slightly weaker, 
positive and significant difference in life cycle peer returns between earnings surprise deciles 1 
and 10. Overall, the findings using the Anthony and Ramesh (1992) life cycle measure confirm 
the previously reported results and provide evidence that is it is unlikely that the results are driven 
by the underlying cash flows itself.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The role of industry fundamentals has been explored extensively by prior literature. For example, 
studies have identified industry as an important factor driving analyst expertise (Kadan et al. 2012), 
the behavior of accruals (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995), and earnings persistence (Hui et al. 
2016). As part of this literature, Foster (1981) documents the existence of information transfers at 
the industry level and shows that earnings releases of one firm provide information that is relevant 
for valuing other non-announcing firms in the same industry. However, despite its importance, it 
is unlikely that industry is the only factor that determines accounting fundamentals. In line with 
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this point, Fairfield, Ramnath, and Yohn (2009) show that whereas industry models help to predict 
future growth, they do little to improve the accuracy of profitability forecasts and, in fact, can lead 
to forecasts that are less accurate.   
Building on studies in the organization literature that since long have shown that firm 
decisions and firm decision-making processes vary predictably across organizational life cycle 
stages (e.g., Miller and Friesen 1983), in this study we investigate the extent to which there are 
intra-life cycle information transfers. We first document considerable commonalities across firms 
in the same life cycle stage, by showing that they have greater accounting comparability and higher 
synchronicity in returns, operating performance, and investments. We then find that the earnings 
announcement returns of large announcing firms are positively associated with same-window 
returns of non-announcing peers in the same life cycle stage. These information transfers across 
firms within a life cycle stage are also economically significant. For example, after ranking 
announcing firms based on the magnitude of their earnings surprise, we find a return differential 
of 0.081% to 0.156% between peer firms matched to announcing firms in the lowest and highest 
earnings surprise decile. These magnitudes are comparable to what previous literature has found 
for intra-industry information transfers. Further tests reveal that these results are strongest for firms 
in the introduction, mature, shakeout, and decline stages. In these latter two stages, the differences 
in returns between peer firms in the lowest and highest earnings surprise decile increase to up to 
0.293%. We also document a role for firm life cycle in the transfer of industry information by 
showing that intra-industry information transfers are greater when the industry peers are in the 
same life cycle stage. We further find that (transient) institutions who own shares in both the 
announcing firm and the life cycle peer firm are an important mechanism by which life cycle 
information spills over between the two firms.  
32 
 
Overall, the findings in this study have important implications for firm valuation and 
contribute to the literature on the role of economic fundamentals in the determination of accounting 
measures. Moreover, this study complements prior studies on firm life cycle by providing 
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Accounting Comparability, Fundamental and Return Synchronicity, and Life Cycle Pairs  
 All Firm-Pairs  Firm-Pairs within the same Fama French 48 Industry 
Variables Acctcomp Synch_ROA Synch_Sale Synch_Capx Synch_Ret Acctcomp Synch_ROA Synch_Sale Synch_Capx Synch_Ret 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept -3.837*** -2.842*** -3.331*** -3.68*** -9.213*** -3.297*** -2.867*** -3.774*** -3.804*** -9.447*** 
 (-12.29) (-57.53) (-40.63) (-83.05) (-71.38) (-9.99) (-37.78) (-40.54) (-45.45) (-72.40) 
SameFF48 0.114*** 0.132*** 0.372*** -0.011*** 0.176***           
 (9.62) (28.49) (36.90) (-3.95) (15.53)           
SameLC 0.440*** 0.026*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.508*** 0.059*** 0.069*** 0.015*** 0.028*** 
 (42.86) (16.39) (4.40) (8.37) (9.56) (33.33) (11.56) (8.27) (4.42) (3.40) 
SameEX 0.012 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.037*** -0.034 0.041*** 0.068*** 0.050*** -0.024 
 (1.07) (8.29) (7.80) (12.50) (5.86) (-1.63) (5.57) (5.59) (9.52) (-1.57) 
SameST 0.008 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.004 0.157*** 0.030 0.033*** 0.050*** 0.009 0.129*** 
 (0.55) (6.89) (3.80) (1.34) (19.69) (1.33) (4.54) (5.39) (1.52) (9.95) 
Diff_AGE 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.006*** 
 (5.24) (-6.75) (-5.53) (4.06) (-0.22) (-3.57) (-3.17) (1.20) (-0.61) (-13.68) 
Diff_ROA -2.478*** 0.148*** -0.015 0.025** 0.556*** -2.455*** 0.048*** 0.028 0.004 0.351*** 
 (-29.30) (11.87) (-0.84) (2.52) (22.09) (-25.67) (2.83) (1.17) (0.31) (11.40) 
Diff_EPS -0.27*** 0.005*** 0.006*** -0.002*** -0.029*** -0.356*** -0.005** 0.010*** 0.002 -0.064*** 
 (-41.43) (5.46) (4.83) (-3.13) (-17.18) (-31.68) (-2.37) (3.82) (1.45) (-20.16) 
Diff_BTM -0.634*** 0.005* 0.028*** 0.003 -0.234*** -0.892*** 0.015*** 0.044*** 0.008** -0.318*** 
 (-29.55) (1.94) (8.57) (1.62) (-38.38) (-25.38) (2.70) (5.03) (2.21) (-31.97) 
Diff_LEV -1.107*** -0.047*** 0.017 0.003 -0.044*** -0.692*** -0.075*** -0.068*** -0.036*** -0.091*** 
 (-17.90) (-5.70) (1.39) (0.48) (-2.73) (-8.44) (-4.65) (-2.75) (-2.89) (-3.31) 
Diff_AT -0.037*** 0.004*** -0.003*** -0.017*** 0.018*** 0.059*** 0.009*** -0.014*** -0.026*** -0.095*** 
 (-4.97) (3.23) (-1.65) (-17.17) (5.01) (4.42) (3.30) (-2.90) (-10.70) (-14.21) 
Diff_INT 0.052 -0.064*** -0.047*** -0.076*** 0.061*** -0.221*** -0.174*** -0.119*** -0.058*** -0.415*** 
 (1.18) (-7.21) (-3.43) (-10.50) (3.35) (-3.32) (-9.27) (-4.70) (-4.17) (-12.49) 
Diff_EMP 2.073*** 0.914*** 1.261*** 1.125*** 0.211 3.856*** 1.251** 1.564*** 1.414*** 0.828 
 (2.70) (4.09) (5.22) (6.91) (0.65) (3.54) (2.51) (2.96) (4.47) (1.19) 
Diff_PRC 0.010*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.016*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (25.22) (-3.85) (-6.73) (0.34) (18.33) (24.22) (-0.17) (3.27) (-4.40) (15.55) 
Diff_GRW -0.481*** -0.010** 0.045*** 0.000 0.023*** -0.361*** -0.025*** -0.104*** -0.030*** 0.109*** 
 (-16.71) (-2.32) (6.67) (0.12) (2.85) (-12.40) (-3.89) (-10.01) (-5.75) (10.14) 
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Diff_MVE -0.136*** -0.008*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.338*** -0.253*** -0.02*** -0.015*** 0.004* -0.318*** 
 (-17.12) (-6.86) (0.12) (-3.87) (-82.70) (-18.42) (-7.33) (-3.34) (1.67) (-42.50) 
Diff_CFO 0.120 -0.015 -0.097*** -0.007 0.194*** -0.891*** 0.058*** -0.024 0.019 0.354*** 
 (1.45) (-1.18) (-5.21) (-0.67) (8.11) (-9.36) (2.99) (-0.82) (1.25) (11.77) 
Diff_CFI -0.415*** -0.011 -0.091*** -0.005 0.054*** -0.283*** -0.017 -0.16*** -0.054*** 0.123*** 
 (-9.22) (-1.28) (-7.28) (-0.68) (3.76) (-5.30) (-1.30) (-8.32) (-5.01) (6.07) 
Diff_CFF 0.795*** -0.006 -0.072*** -0.033*** -0.080*** 0.752*** -0.002 -0.078*** -0.049*** -0.247*** 
 (21.66) (-1.02) (-8.01) (-6.81) (-7.55) (16.75) (-0.26) (-6.10) (-6.88) (-16.18) 
LnAT_i 0.195*** 0.003* 0.019*** 0.037*** 0.341*** 0.191*** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.044*** 0.48*** 
 (21.81) (1.72) (7.02) (26.25) (77.58) (17.34) (4.95) (4.59) (20.62) (63.71) 
LnAT_j 0.149*** 0.000 0.021*** 0.037*** 0.306*** 0.162*** 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.046*** 0.478*** 
 (60.11) (0.20) (35.71) (49.97) (177.27) (44.37) (13.99) (17.19) (29.09) (74.71) 
ROA_i 2.803*** 0.110*** 0.005 -0.078*** 0.269*** 1.443*** 0.074*** -0.008 -0.115*** -0.367*** 
 (22.73) (5.65) (0.20) (-5.59) (7.32) (12.20) (3.10) (-0.23) (-6.44) (-8.70) 
ROA_j 2.638*** 0.145*** 0.010 -0.071*** 0.323*** 1.308*** 0.081*** -0.004 -0.089*** -0.421*** 
 (42.88) (17.94) (1.01) (-13.72) (19.27) (17.24) (7.05) (-0.31) (-9.32) (-15.67) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations 75,046,447 75,046,447 75,046,447 75,046,447 75,046,447 4,615,177 4,615,177 4,615,177 4,615,177 4,615,177 
R-squared 0.292 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.345 0.318 0.011 0.069 0.007 0.374 
This table presents the results of the tests in which we investigate whether firm-pairs in the same life cycle stage have greater accounting comparability (columns 1 and 6) and greater 
synchronicity in their return on assets (columns 2 and 7), sales (columns 3 and 8), capital expenditures (columns 4 and 9), and returns (columns 5 and 10). The sample includes all 
firm-pairs in Compustat and CRSP over the period 1987-2017 with available data to calculate the variables of interest and the control variables. Columns (1) to (5) report the results 
on the full sample that includes all firm-pairs, while Columns (6) to (10) report the results on a subset of firm-pairs active in the same Fama French 48 Industry. We use the Defranco 
et al. (2011) measure to capture accounting comparability between two firms in a pair (Acctcomp) and measure synchronicity as the natural logarithm of the R-squared of a regression 
of firm i’s return on assets/sales/capital expenditures on firm j’s return on assets/sales/capital expenditures over the three-year period (12 quarters) that ends at fiscal year-end 
(Synch_ROA; Synch_Sale; Synch_Capx). We measure stock return synchronicity (Synch_Ret) as the natural logarithm of the R-squared of a regression of daily stock returns of firm 
i on the daily stock returns of firm j, over the 12-month period in fiscal year t. We control for other determinants of accounting comparability and performance and return synchronicity. 
All control variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year. SameEX is an indicator variable that is equal to one if both firms are listed on the same stock exchange (based on 
CRSP data), and zero otherwise. SameST is an indicator variable that is equal to one if both firms are headquartered in the same state, and zero otherwise. Diff_AGE is the absolute 
difference in firm age. Diff_ROA is the absolute difference in return on assets (IB / lagged AT). Diff_EPS is the absolute difference in earnings per share (IB / CSHO). Diff_BTM is 
the absolute difference in the book-to-market ratio (SE / PRCC_F*CSHO). Diff_LEV is the absolute difference in leverage (DLC + DLTT / AT). Diff_AT is the absolute difference 
in log assets (AT). Diff_INT is the absolute difference in intangible asset intensity (INTAN / AT). Diff_EMP is the absolute difference in employee intensity (EMP / AT). Diff_PRC 
is the absolute difference in stock price (PRCC_F). Diff_GRW is the absolute difference in sales growth ([SALE / lagged SALE]-1). Diff_MVE is the absolute difference in log 
market capitalization (PRCC_F*CSHO). LnAT is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i and j (AT). ROA is the return on assets of firm i and j (IB / lagged AT). Reported T-
statistics are based on standard errors clustered at firm level (firm i). Continuous non-return and non-log measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. *, **, and *** indicate 






All firm-quarters in Compustat-CRSP merged during    820,512 
Less: Firms not traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ (6,359) 
Less: Firms with no December fiscal year-end (284,376) 
Less: Missing industry or industry = Financial & Utilities (156,623) 
Less: Missing analyst forecast (128,622) 
Less: Missing life cycle information (13,641) 
Less: Missing announcement CARs (238) 







Variable N Mean Std. Dev P25 Median P75 
All Firms 
Introduction 230,653 0.130 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Growth 230,653 0.337 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Mature 230,653 0.392 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Shakeout 230,653 0.077 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Decline 230,653 0.065 0.246 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NYSE 230,653 0.450 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AMEX 230,653 0.042 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NASDAQ 230,653 0.508 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CAR3_VW 230,653 -0.001 0.095 -0.041 -0.001 0.04 
CAR3_SZ 222,339 0.000 0.095 -0.040 0.000 0.041 
Analyst 230,653 6.233 5.872 2.000 4.000 9.000 
FE 217,050 0.002 0.020 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
MVE 226,946 6.485 1.87 5.132 6.379 7.701 
Lev 221,228 0.245 0.237 0.036 0.217 0.373 
BTM 226,896 0.534 0.469 0.244 0.43 0.698 
ROA 225,941 -0.005 0.059 -0.006 0.009 0.021 
Loss 230,653 0.307 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CFO 212,839 0.011 0.057 -0.004 0.019 0.040 
CFF 212,767 0.020 0.112 -0.014 0.000 0.011 
CFI 212,783 -0.028 0.076 -0.035 -0.014 -0.004 
Sgrowth 207,865 0.111 0.485 -0.024 0.083 0.229 
Sales 230,130 689,888 1790,369 25,899 112,068 467,856 
Tothold 230,653 134.665 183.141 31.000 80.000 163.000 
Trahold 230,653 36.175 39.922 9.000 24.000 50.000 
Dedhold 230,653 1.955 2.918 0.000 1.000 2.000 
Qixhold 230,653 89.388 131.351 20.000 49.000 102.000 
Large Announcing Firms 
Introduction 15,355 0.200 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Growth 15,355 0.202 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mature 15,355 0.204 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Shakeout 15,355 0.200 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Decline 15,355 0.195 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NYSE 15,355 0.780 0.414 0.000 1.000 1.000 
AMEX 15,355 0.021 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NASDAQ 15,355 0.199 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CAR3_VW 15,355 -0.003 0.081 -0.033 -0.001 0.03 
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CAR3_SZ 14,133 -0.002 0.081 -0.033 -0.001 0.030 
Analyst 15,355 9.994 7.518 4.000 9.000 15.000 
FE 14,721 0.004 0.023 -0.002 0.000 0.003 
MVE 15,040 8.339 2.292 6.534 8.418 10.161 
Lev 14,486 0.304 0.208 0.167 0.281 0.410 
BTM 15,035 0.582 0.501 0.277 0.494 0.776 
ROA 15,046 0.003 0.036 -0.002 0.008 0.018 
Loss 15,355 0.272 0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CFO 13,961 0.009 0.040 -0.008 0.014 0.031 
CFF 13,937 0.002 0.059 -0.018 -0.002 0.011 
CFI 13,950 -0.009 0.049 -0.022 -0.009 0.000 
Sgrowth 14,535 0.095 0.361 -0.039 0.061 0.192 
Sales 15,355 4145,308 4611,567 368,831 2,033 6,808 
Tothold 15,355 350.614 385.226 84.000 207.000 486.000 
Trahold 15,355 74.912 68.847 24.000 55.000 103.000 
Dedhold 15,355 5.240 5.727 1.000 3.000 7.000 
Qixhold 15,355 250.608 284.307 53.000 137.000 352.000 
Life Cycle Peers 
Peer_Introduction 4,453,143 0.135 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Peer_Growth 4,453,143 0.341 0.474 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Peer_Mature 4,453,143 0.383 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Peer_Shakeout 4,453,143 0.077 0.266 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Peer_Decline 4,453,143 0.065 0.246 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Peer_NYSE 4,453,143 0.435 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Peer_AMEX 4,453,143 0.045 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Peer_NASDAQ 4,453,143 0.519 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Peer_CAR3_VW 4,452,631 0.000 0.060 -0.024 -0.002 0.022 
Peer_CAR3_SZ 4,280,298 0.000 0.059 -0.024 -0.001 0.021 
Peer_Analyst 4,453,143 6.011 5.780 2.000 4.000 8.000 
Peer_MVE 4,378,318 6.399 1.864 5.055 6.290 7.607 
Peer_Lev 4,274,370 0.246 0.240 0.036 0.218 0.376 
Peer_BTM 4,377,376 0.541 0.486 0.245 0.434 0.705 
Peer_ROA 4,354,510 -0.007 0.061 -0.008 0.009 0.021 
Peer_Loss 4,453,143 0.320 0.466 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Peer_CFO 4,099,312 0.010 0.059 -0.005 0.019 0.04 
Peer_CFF 4,097,991 0.022 0.117 -0.013 0.000 0.012 
Peer_CFI 4,098,302 -0.029 0.078 -0.036 -0.014 -0.004 
Peer_Sgrowth 3,989,573 0.113 0.495 -0.026 0.085 0.235 
Peer_Sales 4,442,449 635.36 1661.305 23.951 101.766 424.408 
Peer_Tothold 4,453,143 127.788 176.85 29.000 75.000 154.000 
Peer_Trahold 4,453,143 34.674 38.941 8.000 23.000 47.000 
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Peer_Dedhold 4,453,143 1.848 2.79 0.000 1.000 2.000 
Peer_Qixhold 4,453,143 84.390 126.499 18.000 46.000 96.000 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses. The sample consists of 230,653 firm-quarter 
observations over the period 1987-2017. The sample with large announcing firms consists of firm-quarter observations of the 25 
largest firms (by sales) in a fiscal quarter and life cycle stage. The sample of life cycle peers consists of firm-quarter observations 
of all firms in the same fiscal quarter and life cycle stage as the large announcing firm that do not have a concurrent earnings 
announcement (i.e., during the period that starts two days prior to the announcing firm’s earnings announcement and ends two days 
after the announcing firm’s earnings announcement). Introduction is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm is in the 
introduction stage, zero otherwise. Growth is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm is in the growth stage, zero 
otherwise. Mature is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm is in the mature stage, zero otherwise. Shakeout is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm is in the shakeout stage, zero otherwise. Decline is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if the firm is in the decline stage, zero otherwise. Life cycle assignments are based on cash flow patterns, following 
Dickinson (2011). NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ are indicator variables that are equal to one if the firm’s main stock exchange 
listing is on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation System, respectively, zero otherwise. CAR3_VW is the cumulative abnormal return around the earnings announcement 
using CRSP value-weighted returns to calculate daily abnormal returns. CAR3_SZ is the cumulative abnormal return around the 
earnings announcement using CRSP size deciles to calculate daily abnormal returns. Analyst is equal to the number of analysts 
issuing a quarterly earnings forecast. FE is the signed analyst forecast error, calculated as the firm’s actual earnings as reported by 
I/B/E/S, less the latest consensus (mean) forecast issued prior to the end of the fiscal quarter, scaled by the stock price (PRCCQ) at 
the end of the fiscal quarter. MVE is the market capitalization at the end of the fiscal quarter (PRCCQ*CSHOQ). Lev is the 
percentage of debt in a firm’s capital structure [(DLTTQ+DLCQ] / ATQ). BTM is the book-to-market ratio (SEQQ / 
[PRCCQ*CSHOQ]). ROA is the quarterly return on assets (IBQ / lagged ATQ). Loss is an indicator variable that is equal to one if 
the firm reports a loss (IBQ < 0), zero otherwise. CFO, CFF, and CFI are (scaled) quarterly cash flows from operating, financing, 
and investing activities, respectively. Sgrowth is the percentage change in sales between the current quarter and the same fiscal 
quarter in the prior year. Sales are quarterly sales (SALEQ). Tothold, Trahold, Dedhold, and Qixhold are the number of (all, 
transient, dedicated, index-following) institutions that own stock in the firm at the end of the quarter. Variables that start with Peer_ 
are defined analogously but refer to measures for the matched life cycle peers. Peer_CAR3_VW and Peer_CAR3_SZ are the non-
announcing peer firm’s three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcing firm’s earnings announcement. Continuous 




Intra-Life Cycle Information Transfers - Full Sample 
Panel A: Regression of Life Cycle Peer Returns on Announcing Firm Returns 
Peer_CAR_VW = α + β1CAR_VW + ɛ  
Variable   Coefficient t-statist p-value 
Intercept    0.00004 0.79 0.4290 
CAR_VW   0.01208 18.15 <.0001 
N = 4,452,631, R-Squared = 0.0002 
Peer_CAR_SZ = α + β1CAR_SZ + ɛ  
Variable   Coefficient t-stat. p-value 
Intercept    0.00028 4.69 <.0001 
CAR_SZ   0.00822 11.79 <.0001 
N = 3,742,782, R-Squared = 0.0000 
 
Panel B: Announcing Firm Earnings Surprises and Market Reactions 
Peer_CAR_VW = α + β1SD + ɛ  
Variable   Coefficient t-stat. p-value 
Intercept    -0.00058 -2.83 0.0197 
SD   0.00012 2.95 0.0163 
N = 10, R-Squared = 0.5458 
Peer_CAR_SZ = α + β1SD + ɛ  
Variable   Coefficient t-stat. p-value 
Intercept    0.00008 0.83 0.4261 
SD   0.00006 2.68 0.0252 
N = 10, R-Squared = 0.4185 
Surprise Deciles (SD) Announcing Returns  Life Cycle Peer Returns 
 CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ  CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ 
1 -2.65% -2.90%  -0.1053% -0.0095% 
2 -1.86% -1.80%  -0.0502% 0.0160% 
3 -1.70% -1.75%  -0.0167% 0.0309% 
4 -1.15% -1.16%  -0.0202% 0.0184% 
5 -0.28% -0.31%  0.0146% 0.0283% 
6 0.19% 0.13%  0.0602% 0.0760% 
7 0.73% 0.82%  0.0293% 0.0251% 
8 1.14% 1.12%  0.0275% 0.0454% 
9 1.47% 1.58%  -0.0214% 0.0218% 
10 2.33% 2.51%  0.0507% 0.0717% 
D10 - D1 4.98% 5.41%  0.1560% 0.0812% 
t-stat. 180.34 175.86  8.54 4.41 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
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Panel C: Surprise Deciles and Market Reactions: Analysis by Life Cycle Stage 
  D1 D10 D10 - D1 t-statistic p-value 
Introduction       
Peer_CAR3_VW  -0.1790% 0.0307% 0.2100% 4.88 <.0001 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  -0.0370% 0.0015% 0.0389% 0.90 0.3676 
Growth       
Peer_CAR3_VW  -0.0150% -0.0080% 0.0076% 0.31 0.7562 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  0.0665% 0.0465% -0.0020% -0.82 0.4117 
Mature       
Peer_CAR3_VW  0.0168% 0.1060% 0.0892% 3.40 0.0007 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  0.0234% 0.0993% 0.0758% 2.88 0.0039 
Shakeout       
Peer_CAR3_VW  -0.1550% 0.0171% 0.1730% 2.70 0.0070 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  -0.1640% 0.1060% 0.2700% 4.21 <.0001 
Decline       
Peer_CAR3_VW  -0.1320% 0.1600% 0.2930% 4.83 <.0001 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  -0.0260% 0.1750% 0.2010% 3.31 0.0009 
This table reports the results of the tests investigating life cycle information transfers on the full sample of peer firms. The sample 
of life cycle peers consists of firm-quarter observations of all firms in the same fiscal quarter and life cycle stage as the large 
announcing firm that do not have a concurrent earnings announcement (i.e., during the period that starts two days prior to the 
announcing firm’s earnings announcement and ends two days after the announcing firm’s earnings announcement). Panel A reports 
the results of a regression of non-announcing peer firms’ three-day cumulative abnormal returns around an announcing firm’s 
earnings announcement on the announcing firm’s own earnings announcement cumulative abnormal return. T-statistics and p-
values are based on standard errors clustered at peer firm level. Panel B reports the analysis conditional on the announcing firm’s 
earnings surprise. Specifically, SD is the quarterly decile rank of the announcing firms’ scaled analyst forecast errors (FE). The 
first part of Panel B reports the results of a regression of the non-announcing peer firms’ three-day cumulative abnormal returns 
around an announcing firm’s earnings announcement on the announcing firm’s earnings surprise decile rank. The second part of 
Panel B reports announcing firms’ and non-announcing peers’ average returns in each of the earnings surprise deciles and estimates 
the return differential between firms in earnings surprise decile 10 and earnings surprise decile 1. Panel C reports the return 
differential between firms in earnings surprise decile 10 and earnings surprise decile 1 for each of the life cycle stages separately. 




Regression Specification of Intra-Life Cycle Information Transfers 
Variables Peer Return 
 CAR_VW CAR_SZ CAR_VW CAR_SZ CAR_VW CAR_SZ CAR_VW CAR_SZ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Intercept -0.019 -0.013 -0.022 -0.015 -0.022 -0.015 -0.021 -0.015 
 (-0.96) (-0.82) (-1.08) (-0.92) (-1.09) (-0.93) (-1.05) (-0.93) 
Low_Decile -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-7.32) (-4.40) (-5.39) (-3.47) (-5.26) (-3.35) (-5.37) (-3.34) 
MVE   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
   (6.95) (7.69) (6.95) (7.52) (5.12) (6.72) 
Peer_MVE   -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
   (-4.33) (-6.24) (-4.20) (-6.13) (-4.37) (-6.10) 
Lev   0.001* 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 
   (1.78) (3.38) (1.99) (3.56) (2.48) (3.95) 
Peer_Lev   -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 
   (-1.14) (-1.77) (-1.13) (-1.77) (-0.96) (-1.61) 
BTM   -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
   (-0.64) (1.13) (-0.59) (1.16) (-0.53) (1.09) 
Peer_BTM   0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
   (6.72) (6.02) (6.64) (5.97) (6.77) (6.09) 
ROA   0.014*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
   (3.65) (4.04) (3.74) (3.97) (3.74) (4.10) 
Peer_ROA   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
   (-0.16) (-0.19) (-0.30) (-0.17) (0.03) (0.07) 
Loss   0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
   (3.54) (4.73) (3.54) (4.76) (3.63) (4.82) 
Peer_Loss   -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
   (-2.81) (-2.54) (-2.95) (-2.59) (-2.92) (-2.84) 
CFO     0.002 0.005 0.002 0.006 
     (0.39) (1.10) (0.51) (1.30) 
CFF     0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
     (0.58) (0.45) (0.74) (0.50) 
CFI     0.007 0.006 0.007 0.005 
     (1.57) (1.50) (1.63) (1.15) 
Peer_CFO     -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
     (-0.29) (-0.41) (0.02) (-0.05) 
Peer_CFF     -0.002 -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** 
     (-1.27) (-0.79) (-2.51) (-2.17) 
Peer_CFI     0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
     (0.43) (0.31) (0.33) (0.08) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Life Cycle FE No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Abs(Diff_CF) No No No No No No Yes Yes 
         
Observations 418,683 418,683 418,683 418,683 418,683 418,683 418,683 418,683 
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
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This table reports the results of the regression counterpart of the hedge return test (decile 10 – decile 1) reported in Panel B of Table 
4. Specifically, we restrict the sample to peer firms matched to announcing firms in earnings surprise deciles 1 and 10 and create 
an indicator variable, Low_Decile, that is equal to one for (peer) firms in decile 1, and zero for (peer) firms in decile 10. Column 
(1) and (2) report results controlling for (fiscal year, fiscal quarter, and industry [Fama French 48]) fixed effects only. Control 
variables are added in columns (3) and (4), while columns (5) and (6) further include the announcing and peer firm’s quarterly cash 
flow levels (OANCF / lagged ATQ, Peer_CFO; FINCF / lagged ATQ, Peer_CFF; IVNCF / lagged ATQ, Peer_CFI). Columns 
(7) and (8) further include the absolute differences between announcing and peer firm’s annual cash flow levels (Diff_CFO, 
Diff_CFF, and Diff_CFI) as well as life cycle stage fixed effects. Reported T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at 
peer firm level. Continuous non-return and non-log measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. *, **, and *** indicate 




Intra-Life Cycle Information Transfers – Different Industry  
Panel A: Regression of Life Cycle Peer Returns on Announcing Firm Returns 
Peer_CAR_VW = α + β1CAR_VW + ɛ  
Variable   Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept    0.00006 1.09 0.2763 
CAR_VW   0.00944 14.23 <.0001 
N = 4,246,415, R-Squared = 0.0001 
Peer_CAR_SZ = α + β1CAR_SZ + ɛ  
Variable   Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept    0.00030 4.92 <.0001 
CAR_SZ   0.00571 8.27 <.0001 
N = 3,578,780, R-Squared = 0.0000 
 
Panel B: Announcing Firm Earnings Surprises and Market Reactions 
Peer_CAR_VW = α + β1SD + ɛ  
Variable   Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept    -0.00049 -2.12 0.0633 
SD   0.00011 2.35 0.0433 
N = 10, R-Squared = 0.4564 
Peer_CAR_SZ = α + β1SD + ɛ  
Variable   Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept    0.00017 1.47 0.1762 
SD   0.00004 1.63 0.1366 
N = 10, R-Squared = 0.2712 
Surprise Deciles (SD) Announcing Returns  Life Cycle Peer Returns 
 CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ  CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ 
1 -2.67% -2.90%  -0.1045% -0.0065% 
2 -1.87% -1.82%  -0.0345% 0.0309% 
3 -1.72% -1.76%  -0.0118% 0.0366% 
4 -1.15% -1.16%  -0.0195% 0.0179% 
5 -0.27% -0.29%  0.0232% 0.0353% 
6 0.20% 0.14%  0.0531% 0.0679% 
7 0.73% 0.82%  0.0393% 0.0350% 
8 1.14% 1.12%  0.0196% 0.0369% 
9 1.47% 1.58%  -0.0250% 0.0166% 
10 2.34% 2.52%  0.0418% 0.0637% 
D10 - D1 5.01% 5.41%  0.1462% 0.0702% 
t-statistic 177.11 172.23  7.84 3.74 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.0002 
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Panel C: Surprise Deciles and Market Reactions: Analysis by Life Cycle Stage 
  D1 D10 D10 - D1 t-statistic p-value 
Introduction       
Peer_CAR3_VW  -0.1760% -0.0380% 0.2090% 4.75 <.0001 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  -0.0350% 0.0107% 0.0452% 1.03 0.3040 
Growth       
Peer_CAR3_VW  -0.0190% -0.0220% -0.0030% -0.12 0.9064 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  0.0643% 0.0315% -0.0330% -1.31 0.1904 
Mature       
Peer_CAR3_VW  0.0241% 0.0977% 0.0736% 2.76 0.0058 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  0.0270% 0.0912% 0.0642% 2.40 0.0162 
Shakeout       
Peer_CAR3_VW  -0.1320% 0.0200% 0.1520% 2.34 0.0193 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  -0.1400% 0.1050% 0.2450% 3.76 0.0002 
Decline       
Peer_CAR3_VW  -0.1390% 0.1410% 0.2800% 4.49 <.0001 
Peer_CAR3_SZ  -0.0220% 0.1550% 0.1760% 2.83 0.0047 
This table reports the results of the tests investigating life cycle information transfers on a sample of peer firms that excludes life 
cycle peers that are also industry peers (based on the Fama French 48 industry classification). The sample of life cycle peers consists 
of firm-quarter observations of all firms in the same fiscal quarter and life cycle stage as the large announcing firm that do not have 
a concurrent earnings announcement (i.e., during the period that starts two days prior to the announcing firm’s earnings 
announcement and ends two days after the announcing firm’s earnings announcement) and that are not active in the same industry 
as the announcing firm. Panel A reports the results of a regression of non-announcing peer firms’ three-day cumulative abnormal 
returns around an announcing firm’s earnings announcement on the announcing firm’s own earnings announcement cumulative 
abnormal return. T-statistics and p-values are based on standard errors clustered at peer firm level. Panel B reports the analysis 
conditional on the announcing firm’s earnings surprise. Specifically, SD is the quarterly decile rank of the announcing firms’ scaled 
analyst forecast errors (FE). The first part of Panel B reports the results of a regression of the non-announcing peer firms’ three-
day cumulative abnormal returns around an announcing firm’s earnings announcement on the announcing firm’s earnings surprise 
decile rank. The second part of Panel B reports announcing firms’ and non-announcing peers’ average returns in each of the earnings 
surprise deciles and estimates the return differential between firms in earnings surprise decile 10 and earnings surprise decile 1. 
Panel C reports the return differential between firms in earnings surprise decile 10 and earnings surprise decile 1 for each of the 






Regression Specification of Intra-Life Cycle Information Transfers – Different Industry 
Variables Peer Return 
 CAR_VW CAR_SZ CAR_VW CAR_SZ CAR_VW CAR_SZ CAR_VW CAR_SZ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Intercept -0.023 -0.016 -0.025 -0.018 -0.025 -0.018 -0.024 -0.018 
 (-1.09) (-0.98) (-1.18) (-1.04) (-1.18) (-1.05) (-1.14) (-1.04) 
Low_Decile -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-6.94) (-3.94) (-5.32) (-3.34) (-5.20) (-3.21) (-5.29) (-3.21) 
MVE   0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
   (6.41) (7.27) (6.23) (6.94) (4.19) (6.04) 
Peer_MVE   -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
   (-4.36) (-6.23) (-4.32) (-6.20) (-4.56) (-6.22) 
Lev   0.001* 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.003*** 
   (1.96) (3.53) (2.15) (3.71) (2.57) (4.03) 
Peer_Lev   -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* 
   (-1.20) (-1.90) (-1.19) (-1.90) (-1.02) (-1.73) 
BTM   -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
   (-0.21) (1.61) (-0.17) (1.64) (-0.07) (1.59) 
Peer_BTM   0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
   (6.34) (5.62) (6.23) (5.54) (6.39) (5.68) 
ROA   0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
   (3.01) (3.36) (3.03) (3.23) (2.96) (3.30) 
Peer_ROA   -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
   (-0.19) (-0.22) (-0.59) (-0.44) (-0.21) (-0.15) 
Loss   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
   (3.18) (4.40) (3.24) (4.49) (3.34) (4.55) 
Peer_Loss   -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
   (-3.02) (-2.71) (-3.15) (-2.75) (-3.02) (-2.95) 
CFO     0.005 0.008* 0.006 0.009* 
     (1.18) (1.73) (1.23) (1.91) 
CFF     0.005 0.003 0.006 0.004 
     (1.24) (0.81) (1.48) (0.93) 
CFI     0.008* 0.008* 0.009** 0.007 
     (1.94) (1.79) (2.04) (1.50) 
Peer_CFO     0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 
     (0.26) (0.12) (0.53) (0.49) 
Peer_CFF     -0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.003** 
     (-1.28) (-0.81) (-2.55) (-2.20) 
Peer_CFI     0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
     (0.42) (0.28) (0.34) (0.08) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Life Cycle FE No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Abs(Diff_CF) No No No No No No Yes Yes 
         
Observations 400,366 400,366 400,366 400,366 400,366 400,366 400,366 400,366 
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
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This table reports the results of the regression counterpart of the hedge return test (decile 10 – decile 1) reported in Panel B of Table 
7. Specifically, we restrict the sample to peer firms matched to announcing firms in earnings surprise deciles 1 and 10 and create 
an indicator variable, Low_Decile, that is equal to one for (peer) firms in decile 1, and zero for (peer) firms in decile 10. Column 
(1) and (2) report results controlling for (fiscal year, fiscal quarter, and industry [Fama French 48]) fixed effects only. Control 
variables are added in columns (3) and (4), while columns (5) and (6) further include the announcing and peer firm’s quarterly cash 
flow levels (OANCF / lagged ATQ, Peer_CFO; FINCF / lagged ATQ, Peer_CFF; IVNCF / lagged ATQ, Peer_CFI). Columns 
(7) and (8) further include the absolute differences between announcing and peer firm’s annual cash flow levels (Diff_CFO, 
Diff_CFF, and Diff_CFI) as well as life cycle stage fixed effects. Reported T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at 
peer firm level. Continuous non-return and non-log measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. *, **, and *** indicate 




The Role of Life Cycle in Intra-Industry Information Transfers  
Panel A: Replicating Intra-Industry Information Transfers  
Surprise Deciles (SD) Announcing Returns  Industry Peer Returns 
 CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ  CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ 
1 -2.11% -2.16%  -0.0551% -0.0055% 
2 -1.69% -1.78%  -0.0913% -0.0638% 
3 -1.26% -1.29%  0.0006% 0.0326% 
4 -0.82% -0.87%  -0.0734% -0.0423% 
5 -0.01% -0.04%  0.0535% 0.0835% 
6 0.62% 0.58%  0.0227% 0.0657% 
7 1.07% 1.07%  0.0030% 0.0254% 
8 1.51% 1.48%  -0.0324% -0.0070% 
9 1.78% 1.72%  -0.0018% 0.0249% 
10 3.15% 3.44%  0.1862% 0.2103% 
D10 - D1 5.27% 5.60%  0.2413% 0.2158% 
t-stat. 149.66 142.25  10.64 9.44 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
 
Panel B: Intra-Industry Information Transfers Conditional on Same Life Cycle Stage 
 Different Life Cycle Stage Same Life Cycle Stage 
SD Announcing Returns Industry Peer Returns Announcing Returns Industry Peer Returns 
 CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 -2.21% -2.23% -0.0440% 0.0019% -1.92% -2.02% -0.0774% -0.0205% 
2 -1.74% -1.85% -0.1038% -0.0724% -1.60% -1.67% -0.0695% -0.0486% 
3 -1.27% -1.31% -0.0113% 0.0232% -1.24% -1.27% 0.0223% 0.0499% 
4 -0.80% -0.85% -0.0994% -0.0612% -0.87% -0.89% -0.0222% -0.0046% 
5 -0.02% -0.04% 0.0472% 0.0848% -0.01% -0.03% 0.0666% 0.0808% 
6 0.63% 0.61% 0.0302% 0.0731% 0.59% 0.53% 0.0074% 0.0504% 
7 1.08% 1.09% -0.0231% -0.0010% 1.03% 1.05% 0.0554% 0.0791% 
8 1.41% 1.39% -0.0918% -0.0561% 1.70% 1.65% 0.0793% 0.0865% 
9 1.76% 1.67% -0.0109% 0.0190% 1.82% 1.83% 0.0149% 0.0359% 
10 3.25% 3.56% 0.1580% 0.1879% 2.97% 3.21% 0.2386% 0.2519% 
D10-D1 5.47% 5.79% 0.2020% 0.1860% 4.89% 5.24% 0.3160% 0.2725% 
t-stat. 120.48 114.30 6.87 6.29 89.69 85.65 9.12 7.79 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
         
Diff. Peer CAR3_VW | Same LC: (7)–(3): 0.3160% - 0.2020% = -0.1140%; t-stat: 2.51; p-value: 0.0121 
Diff. Peer CAR3_SZ | Same LC: (8)–(4): 0.2725% - 0.1860% = -0.0865%; t-stat: 1.89; p-value: 0.0591 
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This table reports the results of the tests investigating (the role of firm life cycle in) intra-industry information transfers on the full 
sample of peer firms. The sample of industry peers consists of firm-quarter observations of all firms in the same fiscal quarter and 
industry (Fama French 48) as the large announcing firm that do not have a concurrent earnings announcement (i.e., during the 
period that starts two days prior to the announcing firm’s earnings announcement and ends two days after the announcing firm’s 
earnings announcement). Large announcing firms are the ten largest firms (by sales) in an industry and fiscal quarter. SD is the 
quarterly decile rank of the announcing firms’ scaled analyst forecast errors (FE). Panel A reports announcing firms’ and non-
announcing peers’ average returns in each of the earnings surprise deciles and estimates the return differential between firms in 
earnings surprise decile 10 and earnings surprise decile 1. Panel B investigates intra-industry information transfers conditional on 
being in the same or a different life cycle stage and reports results of a t-test investigating whether the magnitude of intra-industry 
information transfers depends on whether the industry peer is in the same life cycle stage as the announcing firm. Variable 




Intra-Life Cycle Information Transfers and Institutional Cross-Holdings 
Variables                                            Peer Return 
 CAR_VW CAR_SZ CAR_VW CAR_VW CAR_SZ CAR_SZ CAR_VW CAR_SZ 
 Main Transient versus Long-Term (LT) Percentage Transient 
   Transient Long-Term Transient Long-Term   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.00541* 0.00909*** 0.00511 0.00507 0.00821*** 0.00877*** 0.00460 0.00828*** 
 (1.72) (3.01) (1.64) (1.61) (2.75) (2.91) (1.43) (2.67) 
Low_Decile -0.00069 -0.00378* -0.00111 -0.00057 -0.00308 -0.00358* -0.00033 -0.00344 
 (-0.36) (-1.90) (-0.61) (-0.30) (-1.64) (-1.81) (-0.15) (-1.56) 
Inst_Overlap 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00009*** 0.00003*** 0.00008*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00001*** 
 (8.05) (7.24) (6.97) (8.02) (6.33) (7.18) (3.31) (2.61) 
Low*Inst_Overlap -0.00001** -0.00001** -0.00004** -0.00001** -0.00004** -0.00001** -0.00000 0.00001 
 (-2.31) (-2.18) (-2.32) (-2.10) (-2.15) (-2.02) (-0.00) (0.81) 
Inst_Announce 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00002*** 0.00000*** 0.00002*** 0.00000*** -0.00000 0.00000 
 (3.28) (4.49) (4.57) (2.82) (4.35) (4.06) (-0.26) (0.71) 
Low* Inst_Announce 0.00000** -0.00000** 0.00001** 0.00000** -0.00001* -0.00000** 0.00000 -0.00001** 
 (2.56) (-2.37) (2.14) (2.44) (-1.65) (-2.35) (0.42) (-2.26) 
Inst_Peer 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00003*** 0.00001*** 0.00003*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00002*** 
 (3.86) (4.51) (3.35) (3.63) (3.04) (4.38) (3.43) (5.09) 
Low* Inst_Peer 0.00001** 0.00000 0.00002* 0.00001*** 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 
 (2.53) (0.27) (1.78) (2.60) (0.82) (0.31) (1.09) (-1.13) 
Pct_Trs_Overlap        0.00020 0.00029 
       (0.14) (0.20) 
Low*Pct_Trs_Overlap       0.00176 0.00337* 
       (0.93) (1.73) 
Inst_Overlap*Pct_Trs_Overlap      0.00002 0.00003 
       (0.62) (1.02) 
Low* Inst_Overlap*Pct_Trs_Overlap      -0.00005 -0.00009** 
       (-1.17) (-2.03) 
Pct_Trs_Announce        0.00029 -0.00062 
       (0.21) (-0.44) 
Low*Pct_Trs_Announce       -0.00023 -0.00079 
       (-0.12) (-0.41) 
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Inst_Announce*Pct_Trs_Announce      0.00002*** 0.00002** 
       (2.91) (2.39) 
Low* Inst_Announce*Pct_Trs_Announce      0.00001 0.00001 
       (1.14) (0.92) 
Pct_Trs_Peer        0.00205** 0.00294*** 
       (2.03) (2.86) 
Low*Pct_Trs_Peer       -0.00172 -0.00205 
       (-1.26) (-1.47) 
Inst_Peer*Pct_Trs_Peer       -0.00001 -0.00003** 
       (-0.75) (-2.21) 
Low* Inst_Peer*Pct_Trs_Peer      0.00001 0.00003 
       (0.60) (1.49) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Test Transient = LT   Chi-Square: 4.96** Chi-Square: 4.20**   
   p-value: 0.0260 p-value: 0.0403   
         
Observations 490,512 478,576 490,512 490,512 478,576 478,576 490,512 478,576 
R-Squared 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
This table reports the results of the regression specification investigating the effect of institutional cross-holdings on intra-life cycle information transfers. The sample contains all 
(peer) firms in earnings surprise deciles 1 and 10. Low_Decile is equal to one for (peer) firms in decile 1, and zero for (peer) firms in decile 10. Inst_Overlap is equal to the number 
of institutions that own shares in both the announcing firm and the life cycle peer firm. Inst_Announce is equal to the number of institutions that own shares in the announcing firm, 
but not the peer firms. Inst_Peer is equal to the number of institutions that own shares in the peer firm, but not the announcing firm. Pct_Trs_Overlap is equal to the number of 
transient institutions with cross-holdings divided by the total number of institutions with cross-holdings. Pct_Trs_Announce is equal to the number of transient institutions with 
holdings in the announcing firm divided by the total number of institutions with holdings in the announcing firm. Pct_Trs_Peer is equal to the number of transient institutions with 
holdings in the peer firm divided by the total number of institutions with holdings in the peer firm. All measures are calculated at the end of the fiscal quarter. Columns (1) and (2) 
report the results of the main analysis. Columns (3) to (6) report the results of separate regressions in which we distinguish between transient and long-term institutional owners 
based on the classification of Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000). Columns (7) and (8) report the results of a regression that includes interactions with the number of transient 
institutions with (cross-)holdings, relative to all institutions with (cross-)holdings. Reported T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at peer firm level. Continuous non-
return and non-log measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, %%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 





Intra-Life Cycle Information Transfers – Hribar & Yehuda/Anthony & Ramesh Life Cycle 
Measure 
Surprise Deciles (SD) Announcing Returns  Life Cycle Peer Returns 
 CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ  CAR3_VW CAR3_SZ 
1 -1.17% -1.16%  -0.0016% 0.0193% 
2 -1.35% -1.33%  -0.0498% -0.0076% 
3 -0.86% -0.98%  -0.0009% 0.0740% 
4 -0.73% -0.70%  -0.0078% 0.0152% 
5 0.39% 0.36%  -0.0376% 0.0013% 
6 0.48% 0.48%  0.0216% 0.0396% 
7 1.25% 1.33%  0.0068% 0.0464% 
8 1.42% 1.49%  0.0134% 0.0179% 
9 1.46% 1.60%  0.0097% 0.0344% 
10 2.18% 2.30%  0.0973% 0.0863% 
D10 - D1 3.35% 3.46%  0.0990% 0.0671% 
t-statistic 190.55 161.78  7.41 4.98 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
This table reports the results of the tests investigating life cycle information transfers on the full sample of peer firms, using an 
alternative life cycle measure following Anthony and Ramesh (1992) and Hribar and Yehuda (2015). Specifically, a firm’s life 
cycle stage is determined based on the tercile rank of the sum of standardized two-year sales growth, standardized capital 
expenditures (including R&D) scaled by total assets, standardized net capital transactions (change in total stockholder’s equity less 
net income) scaled by total assets, less standardized firm age. The sample of life cycle peers consists of firm-quarter observations 
of all firms in the same fiscal quarter and life cycle stage as the large announcing firm that do not have a concurrent earnings 
announcement (i.e., during the period that starts two days prior to the announcing firm’s earnings announcement and ends two days 
after the announcing firm’s earnings announcement). SD is the quarterly decile rank of the announcing firms’ scaled analyst forecast 
errors (FE) and we report the announcing firms’ and non-announcing peers’ average returns in each of the earnings surprise deciles 
and estimates the return differential between firms in earnings surprise decile 1 and earnings surprise decile 10. Variable definitions 
can be found in Table 3. 
 
